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Presidential elections will be held in Indonesia 
on 9 July 2014. The two candidates seem to 
offer a choice that Papuans have not previously 
encountered in an election: between the old 
military guard and a new face of populist 
leadership. Following Richard Chauvel (2011, 106), 
Papua has become a battle ground in a strug-
gle between a ‘new’ and an ‘old’ Indonesia. 
The ‘old’ Indonesia considers that its soldiers’ 
torturing fellow Indonesian citizens in a most 
barbaric manner is an ‘incident’. The ‘new’ 
Indonesia aspires to the ideals of its original 
founders in becoming a progressive outward 
looking cosmopolitan, multi ethnic and multi 
faith society. The influence of ‘old’ Indonesia 
has made Papua the exception to many of the 
nationwide processes of democratisation. 
This In Brief describes some of the forces at 
play in the presidential election in Papua, including 
various calls for a boycott by separatist/nationalist 
organisations that want Papuans to agitate for self-
determination rather than legitimise a colonial 
state, as well as student groups and district-
level officials who have grievances regarding the 
legislative elections that took place in April 2014.  
It suggests that the contest between ‘new’ and ‘old’ 
can be seen not so much in the choice between two 
very different candidates but rather in the choice 
by government officials to support a militarised 
electoral process rather than a civilian effort to 
manage the election and promote voting. 
Edward Aspinall writes, ‘the two candidates 
… embody very different aspects of Indonesia’s 
recent political history’. The leading presidential 
candidate, Joko Widodo (commonly referred to as 
Jokowi), is the innovative governor of Jakarta who 
gained reputation and public support for his fresh 
ideas and tactics for social development. Jokowi 
made history in June 2014 as the first presidential 
candidate to ever campaign in Papua. Jokowi has 
said that campaigning in Papua reflects his concern 
for Papua, which is ‘remote’ (terpencil) but should 
not feel ‘isolated’ (terkucil).  
The other candidate, Prabowo Subianto 
(popularly known as Prabowo), is a former 
military general (and former son-in-law of autocrat 
Suharto), who is suspected to have committed/
facilitated human rights violations in Jakarta, 
East Timor and Papua (see Van Klinken 2014 
and Hernawan 2014). As a former Special Forces 
(Kopassus) commander in Papua, he is reported to 
have been involved in violence against civilians in 
Mapenduma (1996) and Wamena (1977). 
While the two candidates seem to have little 
in common, commentators have pointed out 
that Jokowi also has many high-ranking military 
officers as supporters, and that neither candidate 
has discussed a political settlement of Papuan 
grievances or the need for dialogue regarding the 
conflict (Hernawan 2014). 
My Papuan colleagues speak of ongoing feelings 
of ‘trauma’ in relation to Prabowo and Kopassus, 
and their reading of public opinion is that Jokowi 
is the more palatable choice between the two 
candidates. He represents the sort of democratic 
progression that has not yet been achieved in 
Papua. Also, Jokowi’s wife, Iriana, is named after 
Papua province (formerly called Irian Jaya), 
where her grandfather taught school for a time. 
In a country where political leaders are almost 
exclusively Javanese, even a minor connection to a 
candidate offers Papuans a chance to read a touch 
of their history and present-day realities in what is 
normally distant national politics. 
Unfortunately, many Papuans are disillusioned 
with Indonesian and Papuan leadership and may 
not see a more democratic future with either Jokowi 
or Prabowo. Among them are the young, educated 
men and women who came of age as the ‘Papuan 
Spring’ — a period of relative openness after the 
fall of Suharto — came to an end and increasingly 
repressive tactics returned (Chauvel 2011). These 
are the youth who have endured the failure of 
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the government’s Special Autonomy solution (see 
Bertrand 2014), which has created resentment 
and internal divisions. Papuan institutions they 
supported have also been challenged over the past 
decade — from the Papua Presidium Council, which 
gradually dissolved after the assassination of leader 
Theys Eluay by Kopassus, to the Papua Peoples’ 
Assembly, which has faced numerous challenges 
to its (limited) mandate to promote Papuan 
culture and rights, and the Papua Customary 
Council, whose chairman, Forkorus Yaboisembut, 
was convicted of treason in 2012 for his role in 
organising the third Papuan Peoples’ Congress.
My own research has documented how, during 
the 2000s, a groups of highland university students 
lost their sense of enthusiasm and optimism that 
an emerging generation of educated Papuans could 
improve social and political conditions in the 
troubled region (Munro 2013; 2009). In thinking 
about how the presidential race might look to some 
of these young men and women, I suspect that 
their aspirations for democratisation have been 
further eroded by the way that the election process 
in Papua has been militarised and politicised, with 
those calling for a boycott, for example, branded as 
‘provocateurs’ and ‘security threats’.
Ten thousand police officers will be providing 
security in the lead up to the election in designated 
areas: Jayapura (the provincial capital), throughout 
the highlands and along the border with Papua 
New Guinea. These are areas where Papua Police 
Commissioner, Tito Karnavian, says there are 
‘ideologies that depart from the ideologies of the 
Indonesian state’. Three thousand of those police 
officers will provide ‘logistical support’ while an 
additional five thousand military personnel will 
‘support’ the police. Images of army commanders 
shepherding ballot boxes through the jungle have 
peppered media coverage. 
A build-up of security forces heading into 
remote areas and the targetting of non-state 
ideologies seems to reflect the practices of the 
‘old’ Indonesia, and are actions that are unlikely 
to impress either those Papuans who believe that 
engaging in the democratic process of electing 
Jokowi for president might represent a step towards 
a ‘new’ Papua, or those who find little reason to 
engage in the election in the first place. 
In Papua, it is not necessarily the presidential 
candidates who reflect the battle between ‘old’ and 
‘new’ Indonesia. Rather, it is the election process 
itself. Re-engaging with critical, educated youth is 
essential to achieving the aims of a ‘new’ Indonesia 
in Papua, and doing so demands a consideration 
of process and context, not just form and results. 
Working towards a demilitarised electoral space, 
particularly by engaging civil society organisations 
rather than security forces in election activities, is an 
important way that the government and development 
partners can promote the sort of democratisation that 
may build confidence and optimism among Papuans.
Author Notes
Jenny Munro is a research fellow in the State, Society and 
Governance in Melanesia Program at the ANU.
References
Bertrand, J. 2014. Autonomy and Stability: The Perils 
of Implementation and ‘Divide-and-Rule’ Tactics in 
Papua, Indonesia. Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 
20(2):174–99.
Chauvel, R. 2011. Policy Failure and Political Impasse: 
Papua and Jakarta a Decade After the ‘Papuan Spring’. 
In P. King, J. Elmslie and C. Webb-Gannon (eds). 
Comprehending West Papua. Sydney: Centre for Peace 
and Conflict Studies, University of Sydney.
Hernawan, B. 17/6/2014. Prabowo or Jokowi for the 
Jakarta–Papua Dialogue? The Jakarta Post. <http://www.
thejakartapost.com/news/2014/06/17/prabowo-or-
jokowi-jakarta-papua-dialogue.html>, viewed 2/7/2014.
Munro, J. 2009. Dreams Made Small: Humiliation and 
Education in a Dani Modernity. PhD thesis, Department 
of Anthropology, Australian National University. <http://
hdl.handle.net/1885/11013>, viewed 2/7/2014.
Munro, J. 2013. The Violence of Inflated Possibilities: 
Education, Transformation and Diminishment in 
Wamena, Papua. Indonesia 95:25–46. 
van Klinken, G. 2014. Prabowo and Human Rights. 
Inside Indonesia 116:Apr–Jun 2014. <http://www.
insideindonesia.org/current-edition/prabowo-and-
human-rights>, viewed 2/7/2014.
